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RFC 5941
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. M'Raihi
Request for Comments: 5941 VeriSign
Category: Informational S. Boeyen
ISSN: 2070-1721 Entrust
M. Grandcolas
Grandcolas Consulting, LLC
S. Bajaj
VeriSign
August 2010
Sharing Transaction Fraud Data
Abstract
This document describes a document format for exchanging transaction
fraud (Thraud) information. It extends the Incident Handling Working
Group (INCH WG) Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
incident reporting document format.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5941.
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RFC 5941 Sharing Transaction Fraud Data August 2010
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................4
2. Requirements Terminology ........................................5
3. Anatomy of a Transaction Fraud ..................................6
4. IODEF-Document Incident Class ...................................7
5. Thraud Record Class Definitions .................................8
5.1. FraudEventPaymentType Class ................................9
5.1.1. PayeeName ..........................................10
5.1.2. PostalAddress ......................................10
5.1.3. PayeeAmount ........................................10
5.2. FraudEventTransferType Class ..............................10
5.2.1. BankID .............................................11
5.2.2. AccountID ..........................................12
5.2.3. AccountType ........................................13
5.2.4. TransferAmount .....................................13
5.3. FraudEventIdentityType Class ..............................13
5.3.1. IdentityComponent ..................................13
5.4. FraudEventOtherType Class .................................14
5.4.1. OtherEventType .....................................15
5.4.2. OtherEventDescription ..............................15
5.5. AmountType Class ..........................................15
5.5.1. Class Contents .....................................15
5.5.2. Currency ...........................................15
5.6. AccountTypeType Class .....................................16
6. IODEF Profile for an Activity Thraud Report ....................16
6.1. Mandatory Components ......................................16
6.2. Recommended Components ....................................17
6.3. Deprecated Components .....................................17
7. IODEF Profile for a Signature Thraud Report ....................19
8. IODEF Additional Attribute Values ..............................19
8.1. Purpose Attribute .........................................19
9. Security Considerations ........................................19
10. IANA Considerations ...........................................21
10.1. Media Sub-Type ...........................................21
10.2. XML Namespace ............................................22
11. Conclusion ....................................................22
12. References ....................................................22
12.1. Normative References .....................................22
12.2. Informative References ...................................23
Appendix A. Thraud Record XML Schema...............................24
Appendix B. Example of a Thraud Report.............................26
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1. Introduction
Financial organizations and merchants that offer online access to
their services frequently encounter fraud perpetrated against their
customers' accounts. In their attempts to combat these frauds, the
organizations and their law enforcement agencies could benefit
greatly by sharing intelligence about fraud incidents and patterns
with similar organizations and agencies. This specification
standardizes a document format by which they can share such
information. It is intended to facilitate multi-vendor
interoperability between conformant components of an open fraud
reporting framework.
Information sharing can take place directly between financial
organizations and merchants. However, the power of shared
intelligence is multiplied many times if the information is gathered
from multiple sources by a shared network, consolidated, and
redistributed to participants.
In this arrangement, incident reports submitted to the network are
called "inbound reports", and reports issued by the network are
called "outbound reports".
Inbound reports will be submitted using a push-style protocol (such
as email or the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)). Outbound
reports will be distributed using either a push-style protocol or a
request/response protocol (such as HTTP).
Inbound reports identify the contributor of the report, as this
information is essential in evaluating the quality of the information
it contains and in contacting the source for the purpose of
clarification. However, outbound reports commonly do not identify
the original sources, as those sources may not wish to be identified
to other subscribers. Such reports should, instead, identify the
consolidator as the source.
A report may describe a particular transaction that is known to be,
or believed to be, fraudulent, or it may describe a pattern of
behavior that is believed to be indicative of fraud. The former type
of report is called an "activity report" and the latter a "signature
report".
The schema defined herein extends the IODEF XML incident reporting
schema [RFC5070].
In Section 3, we introduce the actors in a typical transaction fraud.
Fraud reporting by means of an IODEF-Document is described in
Section 4. We define the elements of a Thraud Report in Section 5.
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In Section 6, we describe the Activity Thraud Report profile of the
IODEF specification. In Section 7, the profile for a Signature
Thraud Report is described. In Section 8, we define new attribute
values for the IODEF Incident class. Security considerations are
described in Section 9. Section 10 contains IANA considerations
regarding the registration of the associated media sub-type and XML
namespace identifier. The Appendices contain the complete XML schema
and a sample Thraud Report.
Data elements in this document are expressed in Unified Modeling
Language (UML) syntax [UML].
XML namespace prefixes are used throughout this document to stand for
their respective XML namespaces, as follows.
iodef: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0
thraud: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-1.0
xs: http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
xsi: http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
2. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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RFC 5941 Sharing Transaction Fraud Data August 2010
3. Anatomy of a Transaction Fraud
The actors in a typical transaction fraud are shown in Figure 1.
+--------------------------------------+
| Fraudsters |
| (collect & verify victim credentials |
| via phishing, malware, etc.) |
+--------------------------------------+
|
|recruit
|
| ----------------disburse profits-----------------
| | |
v v |
+-----------+ +--------------+ +-------+
| | | | | Fraud |
| |--Open Dest Acct-->| Financial |---->| Dest. |
| | | Organization | |Account|
| Fraud | +--------------+ +-------+
| Executors | ^ funds
| | | transfer
| | +--------------+ +-------+
| | | Victim's | | |
| |---Init Transfer-->| Financial |<-o--|Victim |
| | | Organization | | |Account|
+-----------+ +--------------+ | +-------+
v
+-----------+
| Fraud |
| Detection |
| Sensors |
|(realtime/ |
| offline) |
+-----------+
Figure 1. Transaction Fraud Elements
Transaction fraud activities normally involve the following actors:
1. Fraudsters: individuals or organizations that collect victims'
login credentials using a variety of means, including phishing
and malware, and verify them (usually by attempting to log in to
the victim's account). Then, the Fraudsters may either recruit
Fraud Executors themselves or wholesale the victims' credentials
to other Fraudsters, who will, in turn, recruit Fraud Executors.
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2. Fraud Executors: individuals who attempt the fraudulent funds
transfer or payment. In the case of fraudulent funds transfers,
an account at either the same financial organization as that of
the victim or a different one is opened as the destination
account for the fraudulent transfer. Alternatively, a fraudulent
payment is made using a check or electronic transfer.
3. Victims of both credential theft and transaction fraud.
4. Financial organizations that hold the victim's and the Fraud
Executor's accounts.
5. Sensors at the financial organization that detect fraudulent
transaction attempts, either in real-time or after the fact.
The intention of Thraud reporting is to enable any organization that
has detected fraud to share this information, either internally or
with other potential victim organizations. The receiving
organization can use this information, for example, to institute
manual review of transactions initiated from suspicious IP addresses.
4. IODEF-Document Incident Class
A Thraud Report SHALL be an instance of the IODEF-Document class, as
defined in [RFC5070]. The report SHALL contain at least one Incident
object, as defined in [RFC5070]. Each Incident object SHOULD contain
information about a single fraud strategy. One Incident object MAY
contain information about multiple fraudulent transactions that are
consistent with the same fraud strategy. Each fraudulent transaction
SHALL be described in a separate EventData object. The data model
for the Incident class is defined in [RFC5070] and is repeated here,
as Figure 2, for the reader's convenience.
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+-------------+
| Incident |
+-------------+
|ENUM |<>----------[ IncidentID ]
| purpose |<>--{0..1}--[ AlternativeID ]
|STRING |<>--{0..1}--[ RelatedActivity ]
| ext-purpose |<>--{0..1}--[ DetectTime ]
|ENUM |<>--{0..1}--[ StartTime ]
| lang |<>--{0..1}--[ EndTime ]
|ENUM |<>----------[ ReportTime ]
| restriction |<>--{0..*}--[ Description ]
| |<>--{1..*}--[ Assessment ]
| |<>--{0..*}--[ Method ]
| |<>--{1..*}--[ Contact ]
| |<>--{1..*}--[ EventData ]<>--[ AdditionalData ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ History ]
| |<>--{1..*}--[ AdditionalData ]
+-------------+
Figure 2. Data Model of the Incident Class
The AdditionalData abstract class is an extension point in the schema
of the EventData class. Implementers SHALL include exactly one of
the following objects in AdditionalData: FraudEventPayment,
FraudEventTransfer, FraudEventIdentity, or FraudEventOther.
Collectively, these are known as Thraud Records. The corresponding
classes are defined by this specification in Section 5, below.
The Thraud profile of the Incident class is defined in Sections 6 and
7, below.
5. Thraud Record Class Definitions
Thraud Records are expressed in XML. Therefore, the dtype attribute
of the AdditionalData element SHALL be assigned the value "xml".
A payment Thraud Record SHALL be structured as shown in Figure 3.
See also Section 5.1.
+------------------+
| AdditionalData |
+------------------+
| ENUM dtype (xml) |<>-----[ FraudEventPayment ]
+------------------+
Figure 3. The FraudEventPayment Extension
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A funds-transfer Thraud Record SHALL be structured as shown in
Figure 4. See also Section 5.2.
+------------------+
| AdditionalData |
+------------------+
| ENUM dtype (xml) |<>-----[ FraudEventTransfer ]
+------------------+
Figure 4. The FraudEventTransfer Extension
An identity Thraud Record SHALL be structured as shown in Figure 5.
See also Section 5.3.
+------------------+
| AdditionalData |
+------------------+
| ENUM dtype (xml) |<>-----[ FraudEventIdentity ]
+------------------+
Figure 5. The FraudEventIdentity Extension
Other Thraud Records SHALL be structured as shown in Figure 6. See
also Section 5.4. The FraudEventOther class has an open definition
to act as a placeholder for event types that emerge in the future.
+------------------+
| AdditionalData |
+------------------+
| ENUM dtype (xml) |<>----[ FraudEventOther ]
+------------------+
Figure 6. The FraudEventOther Extension
5.1. FraudEventPaymentType Class
The FraudEventPaymentType class is used to report payee instructions
for a fraudulent payment or fraudulent payment attempt. Fraudsters
sometimes use the same payee instructions (including the amount) for
multiple fraudulent payment attempts. By reporting the payment
instructions used in the fraud, other organizations may be able to
detect similar fraudulent payment attempts to the same payee.
The structure of the FraudEventPaymentType class SHALL be as shown in
Figure 7.
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+-------------+
| FraudEvent- |
| PaymentType |
+-------------+
| |<>--{0..1}--[ PayeeName ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ PostalAddress ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ PayeeAmount ]
+-------------+
Figure 7. The FraudEventPaymentType Class
The contents of the FraudEventPaymentType class are described below.
At least one component MUST be present.
5.1.1. PayeeName
Zero or one value of type iodef:MLString. The name of the payee.
5.1.2. PostalAddress
Zero or one value of type iodef:MLString. The format SHALL be as
documented in Section 2.23 of [RFC4519], which defines a postal
address as a free-form multi-line string separated by the "$"
character.
5.1.3. PayeeAmount
Zero or one value of type thraud:AmountType. See Section 5.5.
5.2. FraudEventTransferType Class
The FraudEventTransferType class is used to report the payee
instructions for a fraudulent funds transfer or fraudulent funds
transfer attempt. Fraudsters sometimes use the same payee
instructions (including the amount) for multiple fraudulent funds
transfer attempts. By reporting the funds transfer instructions used
in the fraud, other organizations may be able to detect similar
fraudulent funds transfer attempts to the same payee.
The structure of the FraudEventTransferType class SHALL be as shown
in Figure 8.
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+--------------+
| FraudEvent- |
| TransferType |
+--------------+
| |<>--{0..1}--[ BankID ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ AccountID ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ AccountType ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ TransferAmount ]
+--------------+
Figure 8. The FraudEventTransferType Class
The contents of the FraudEventTransferType class are described below.
At least one component MUST be present.
5.2.1. BankID
Zero or one value of type thraud:BankIDType. The structure of the
BankIDType class SHALL be as shown in Figure 9. The contents SHALL
be of type xs:string. The namespace attribute SHALL be of type
xs:anyURI and SHALL identify the numbering system used to identify
the bank or account.
+-------------------+
| BankIDType |
+-------------------+
| STRING |
| |
| STRING namespace |
+-------------------+
Figure 9. The BankIDType Class
A list of registered namespace identifiers is maintained at:
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/bank-id-
namespace.htm
The following namespace attribute values and their semantics are
registered.
One of the nine-digit Routing Numbers registered to the financial
organization that holds the account, as administered by The American
Bankers Association.
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/bank-id-
namespace.htm#american_bankers_association
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The three-digit Institution Number registered to the financial
organization that holds the account, as administered by The Canadian
Payments Association.
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/bank-id-
namespace.htm#canadian_payments_association
The corresponding AccountID represents the ISO 13616 International
Bank Account Number [ISO13616-1:2007] in the "electronic form" (i.e.,
containing no spaces) that is assigned to the account, as
administered by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT). The corresponding BankID xs:string value
SHOULD be set to the null string. Receiving organizations SHOULD
ignore the corresponding BankID value.
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/bank-id-
namespace.htm#iso13616_1_2007
The eight-character Bank Identifier Code [ISO9362:1994] registered to
the financial organization that holds the account, as administered by
SWIFT.
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/bank-id-
namespace.htm#iso9362_1994
Other namespace values MUST be agreed upon among participants.
Requests to register new values SHOULD be made at:
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/form/bank-id-namespace
Note that a single organization may be identified by more than one
value for any one or more of these namespaces. Therefore, receiving
organizations SHOULD take this into account in their matching
procedure.
5.2.2. AccountID
Zero or one value of type xs:string. The destination primary account
number, as administered by the financial organization identified in
the BankID element. In the case where the BankID namespace attribute
value is "iso13616_1_2007", this element SHALL contain the
International Bank Account Number in the "electronic form" (i.e.,
containing no spaces) that is assigned to the account. In all other
cases, the element SHALL contain only the account number, as
administered by the financial organization that holds the account.
The reporting organization SHALL remove all prefixes that identify
the country, bank, or branch.
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5.2.3. AccountType
Zero or one value of type thraud:AccountTypeType. See Section 5.6.
5.2.4. TransferAmount
Zero or one value of type thraud:AmountType. See Section 5.5.
5.3. FraudEventIdentityType Class
The FraudEventIdentityType class is used to report a fraudulent
impersonation or fraudulent impersonation attempt. By reporting the
impersonation event, other potential victims may be able to detect
similar fraudulent impersonation attempts.
The structure of the FraudEventIdentityType class SHALL be as shown
in Figure 10.
+--------------+
| FraudEvent- |
| IdentityType |
+--------------+
| |<>--{1..*}--[ IdentityComponent ]
+--------------+
Figure 10. The FraudEventIdentityType Class
The contents of the FraudEventIdentityType class are described below.
5.3.1. IdentityComponent
One or more values of type iodef:ExtensionType. This specification
defines two extensions: EmailAddress and UserID.
5.3.1.1. EmailAddress
In reporting an identity fraud event, the reporting institution MAY
include the victim's email address. This SHALL be achieved by
placing an object of type iodef:Email in the IdentityComponent
object. It SHALL contain the email address of the intended fraud
victim.
The IdentityComponent.dtype attribute SHALL be set to the value
"string".
The IdentityComponent.meaning attribute SHALL be set to the value
"victim email address".
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5.3.1.2. UserID
In reporting an identity fraud event, the reporting institution MAY
include the victim's user identifier. This SHALL be achieved by
placing an object of type iodef:ExtensionType in the
IdentityComponent object. The data type of the extension contents
SHALL be xs:string. It SHALL contain the user identifier of the
intended fraud victim.
The IdentityComponent.type attribute SHALL be set to the value
"string".
The IdentityComponent.meaning attribute SHALL be set to the value
"victim user id".
5.4. FraudEventOtherType Class
The FraudEventOtherType class SHALL be used to report fraudulent
events other than those detailed above, such as new event types that
may emerge at some time in the future. This class enables such
events to be reported, using this specification, even though the
specific characteristics of such events have not yet been formally
identified. By reporting the details of these unspecified event
types, other institutions may be able to detect similar fraudulent
activity.
The structure of the FraudEventOtherType class SHALL be as shown in
Figure 11.
+-------------+
| FraudEvent- |
| OtherType |
+-------------+
| |<>----------[ OtherEventType ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ PayeeName ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ PostalAddress ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ BankID ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ AccountID ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ AccountType ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ PayeeAmount ]
| |<>--{0..1}--[ OtherEventDescription ]
+-------------+
Figure 11. The FraudEventOtherType Class
Many of the components of the FraudEventOtherType class are also
components of the FraudEventPaymentType or FraudEventTransferType
classes. Their use in the FraudEventOtherType class is identical to
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their use in those classes. Therefore, their descriptions are not
duplicated here. Only components that are unique to the
FraudEventOtherType class are described below.
5.4.1. OtherEventType
One value of type xs:anyURI. A name that classifies the event.
A list of registered "other event type" identifiers is maintained at:
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/other-event-
type.htm
Requests to register new values SHOULD be made at:
http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/form/other-event-type
5.4.2. OtherEventDescription
Zero or one value of type iodef:MLString. A free-form textual
description of the event.
5.5. AmountType Class
The AmountType class SHALL be as shown in Figure 12. It SHALL be
used to report the amount of a payment or transfer fraud.
+------------------+
| AmountType |
+------------------+
| DECIMAL |
| |
| STRING currency |
+------------------+
Figure 12. The AmountType Class
The contents of the AmountType class are described below.
5.5.1. Class Contents
REQUIRED DECIMAL. The amount of the payment or transfer.
5.5.2. Currency
REQUIRED STRING. The three-letter currency code [ISO4217:2008].
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5.6. AccountTypeType Class
The AccountTypeType class SHALL be as shown in Figure 13. It SHALL
be used to report the type of the destination account.
+-----------------+
| AccountTypeType |
+-----------------+
| STRING |
| |
| STRING lang |
+-----------------+
Figure 13. The AccountTypeType Class
Receiving organizations MUST be capable of processing contents
containing spelling variations.
6. IODEF Profile for an Activity Thraud Report
This section describes the profile of the IODEF Incident class for a
compliant Activity Thraud Report.
6.1. Mandatory Components
A Thraud Report SHALL conform to the data model specified for an
IODEF-Document in [RFC5070]. The following components of that data
model, while optional in IODEF, are REQUIRED in a conformant Thraud
Report.
Receiving organizations MAY reject documents that do not contain all
of these components. Therefore, reporting organizations MUST
populate them all.
Except where noted, these components SHALL be interpreted as
described in [RFC5070].
Incident.Contact.ContactName - The name of the reporting
organization. In case the reporting organization acts as a
consolidator of reports from other organizations, elements of this
class SHALL contain the name of the consolidator.
Incident.Contact.Email - An email address at which the reporting
organization may be contacted.
Incident.Contact.Telephone
Incident.EventData
Incident.EventData.AdditionalData - SHALL contain exactly one Thraud
Record.
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6.2. Recommended Components
Receiving organizations SHOULD be capable of processing the following
components. However, they MUST NOT reject documents because they are
either present or absent.
If available, reporting organizations SHOULD include these components
in Thraud Reports. Except where noted, these components SHALL be
interpreted as described in [RFC5070].
Incident.Contact.Contact
Incident.Contact.Contact.ContactName - The name of the reporting
fraud analyst.
Incident.Contact.Contact.Email - The email address of the reporting
fraud analyst.
Incident.Contact.Contact.Telephone - The telephone number of the
reporting fraud analyst.
Incident.EventData.Method
Incident.EventData.Method.Description
Incident.Assessment.Confidence
Incident.Assessment.Impact
Incident.Assessment.MonetaryImpact
Incident.EventData.DetectTime
Incident.EventData.StartTime
Incident.EventData.EndTime
Incident.EventData.Flow
Incident.EventData.Flow.System
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Service
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.NodeName
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.Address
6.3. Deprecated Components
This profile provides no guidance to receiving organizations on the
proper processing of the following components. Therefore, the
reporting organization has no assurance that the receiving
organization will handle them in an appropriate manner and SHOULD NOT
include them in a Thraud Report. However, receiving organizations
MUST NOT reject reports that do contain these components.
Incident.DetectTime
Incident.AlternativeID
Incident.RelatedActivity
Incident.StartTime
Incident.EndTime
Incident.ReportTime
Incident.Description
Incident.Method
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Incident.History
Incident.AdditionalData
Incident.ext-purpose
Incident.IncidentID.instance
Incident.Contact.Description
Incident.Contact.RegistryHandle
Incident.Contact.PostalAddress
Incident.Contact.Fax
Incident.Contact.TimeZone
Incident.Contact.AdditionalData
Incident.Contact.Contact.Description
Incident.Contact.Contact.RegistryHandle
Incident.Contact.Contact.PostalAddress
Incident.Contact.Contact.Fax
Incident.Contact.Contact.TimeZone
Incident.Contact.Contact.AdditionalData
Incident.Contact.ext-role
Incident.Contact.ext-type
Incident.Contact.Contact.ext-role
Incident.Contact.Contact.ext-type
Incident.EventData.Method.Reference
Incident.EventData.Method.Reference.Description
Incident.EventData.Method.AdditionalData
Incident.EventData.Method.Reference.URL
Incident.Assessment.TimeImpact
Incident.Assessment.AdditionalData
Incident.Assessment.Impact.type
Incident.EventData.Description
Incident.EventData.Contact
Incident.EventData.Assessment
Incident.EventData.Expectation
Incident.EventData.Record
Incident.EventData.EventData
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.OperatingSystem
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Counter
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Description
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.AdditionalData
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.ext-category
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.Location
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.DateTime
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.NodeRole
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.Counter
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Node.Address.ext-category
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Service.ProtoType
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Service.ProtoCode
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Service.ProtoField
Incident.EventData.Flow.System.Service.Application
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7. IODEF Profile for a Signature Thraud Report
A Signature Thraud Report SHALL convey information about the behavior
associated with fraudulent events, rather than reporting the details
of the specific events themselves.
Sharing Signature Thraud Reports helps receiving organizations to
detect suspicious behavior in their own systems.
A Signature Thraud Report SHALL conform to the profile described in
Section 6.
8. IODEF Additional Attribute Values
Additional IODEF attribute standard values are defined here.
8.1. Purpose Attribute
The following additional values are defined for the Incident.purpose
attribute.
Add - The enclosed Thraud Record values SHOULD be added to the corpus
by the receiving organization.
Delete - The enclosed Thraud Record types SHOULD be deleted from the
corpus by the receiving organization.
Modify - The enclosed Thraud Record values SHOULD replace the
corresponding values in the corpus. Where no corresponding types
currently exist in the corpus, the enclosed values SHOULD be added to
the corpus by the receiving organization.
9. Security Considerations
This document describes a document format for exchanging information
about successful or attempted transaction and authentication fraud
incidents. The information is intended to be used to improve the
effectiveness of participants' fraud detection and prevention
programs. The effectiveness of such programs depends critically on
the accuracy, reliability, confidentiality, and timeliness of both
the information and the participants in its exchange. Threats to
accuracy, reliability, and confidentiality include (but are not
limited to) those described here.
Fraudsters may attempt to introduce reports that delete or modify
incident information in the corpus. Therefore, origin authentication
MUST be employed. Human review SHOULD be performed prior to
implementing modifications to the corpus.
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Fraudsters may attempt to interrupt or redirect submissions, thereby
preventing the sharing of intelligence concerning their fraud
strategies. Therefore, authenticated receipts SHOULD be employed.
Fraudsters may attempt to impersonate legitimate submitters, thereby
poisoning their reputations and rendering ineffective their future
submissions. Origin authentication MUST be used to ensure that the
sources of reports are properly identified.
Fraudsters that can view incident reports may adapt their fraud
strategies to avoid detection. Therefore, reports MUST be protected
by confidentiality services including transport encryption and access
control.
In order to prevent inadvertent disclosure of incident data, incident
reports SHOULD be encrypted while in storage.
The submitter of an incident report may incorrectly identify
legitimate activity as a fraud incident. This may lead to denial of
service by a receiving organization that relies on the report or
information derived from the report. Receiving organizations SHOULD
operate a reputation service, in which the reliability of the
information from particular sources is assessed and tracked and
subsequent reports are weighted accordingly. The source of reports
MUST be authenticated. Receiving organizations SHOULD use reports to
step up authentication assurance, rather than simply denying service.
A receiving organization may misuse a Thraud Report to deny service,
resulting in a loss for a legitimate user. If such a user were to
learn the identity of the source of the information that led to the
denial of service, then that source may become implicated in any
resulting claim for compensation. This, in turn, may discourage
reporting organizations from participating in intelligence sharing.
Therefore, original sources SHOULD NOT be identified in consolidated
reports.
Any origin authentication and data integrity mechanism that is
acceptable to both parties MAY be used.
Any transport confidentiality mechanism that is acceptable to both
parties MAY be used.
This specification does not include a data compression technique.
Therefore, it does not introduce any denial of service
vulnerabilities related to decompression.
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10. IANA Considerations
This specification registers two identifiers:
o The media sub-type name "thraud+xml" in the standard registration
tree.
o The xml namespace identifier - urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-1.0.
10.1. Media Sub-Type
Type name: application
Subtype name: thraud+xml
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: "charset": same as the charset parameter of
application/xml, as specified in [RFC3023].
Encoding considerations: same as encoding considerations of
application/xml, as specified in [RFC3023].
Security considerations: in addition to the security considerations
described in Section 9, this registration has all of the security
considerations described in [RFC3023].
Interoperability considerations: None beyond the interoperability
considerations described in [RFC3023].
Published specification: the media type data format is defined in RFC
5941.
Applications that use this media type: transaction and authentication
fraud analysis and reporting applications, and risk-based
transaction and authentication evaluation applications.
Additional information
Magic number(s): none
File extension: .tfi
Macintosh file type codes: none
Person and email address to contact for further information:
"D M'Raihi <davidietf@gmail.com>"
Intended usage: LIMITED USE
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Restrictions on usage: thraud media are intended for no usage other
than the exchange of fraud intelligence data.
Author: D M'Raihi
Change controller: the IESG
10.2. XML Namespace
IANA has registered the xml namespace identifier:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-1.0
Registrant Contact:
Siddharth Bajaj
VeriSign, Inc.
487 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Email: sbajaj@verisign.com
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
11. Conclusion
This specification introduces a transaction fraud (Thraud) reporting
document structure that enables the sharing of fraud data. Based on
the IODEF-Document format, the proposed extension facilitates
interoperability to increase the security of online applications.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[ISO13616-1:2007] Financial services - International bank account
number (IBAN) -- Part 1: Structure of the IBAN,
ISO 13616-1:2007.
[ISO4217:2008] Financial services - Codes for the representation
of currencies and funds, ISO 4217:2008.
[ISO9362:1994] Banking -- Banking telecommunication messages --
Bank identifier codes, ISO 9362:1994.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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RFC 5941 Sharing Transaction Fraud Data August 2010
[RFC3023] Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML
Media Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.
[RFC4519] Sciberras, A., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Schema for User Applications",
RFC 4519, June 2006.
[RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The
Incident Object Description Exchange Format",
RFC 5070, December 2007.
12.2. Informative References
[UML] Information technology -- Open Distributed
Processing -- Unified Modeling Language (UML)
Version 1.4.2, ISO/IEC 19501:2005.
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Appendix A. Thraud Record XML Schema
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-1.0"
xmlns:thraud="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-1.0"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
schemaLocation="
http://www.cert.org/ietf/inch/schema/rfc5070.xsd"/>
<xs:element name="FraudEventPayment"
type="thraud:FraudEventPaymentType"/>
<xs:element name="FraudEventTransfer"
type="thraud:FraudEventTransferType"/>
<xs:element name="FraudEventIdentity"
type="thraud:FraudEventIdentityType"/>
<xs:element name="FraudEventOther"
type="thraud:FraudEventOtherType"/>
<xs:complexType name="FraudEventPaymentType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="PayeeName" type="iodef:MLStringType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="PostalAddress" type="iodef:MLStringType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="PayeeAmount" type="thraud:AmountType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="FraudEventTransferType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="BankID" type="thraud:BankIDType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="AccountID" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="AccountType" type="iodef:MLStringType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="TransferAmount" type="thraud:AmountType"
minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="FraudEventIdentityType">
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element name="IdentityComponent"
type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="FraudEventOtherType">
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<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="OtherEventType" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<xs:element name="PayeeName" type="iodef:MLStringType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="PostalAddress" type="iodef:MLStringType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="BankID" type="thraud:BankIDType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="AccountID" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="AccountType" type="iodef:MLStringType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="PayeeAmount" type="thraud:AmountType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="OtherEventDescription"
type="iodef:MLStringType" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="AmountType">
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:decimal">
<xs:attribute name="currency" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="BankIDType">
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:string">
<xs:attribute name="namespace" type="xs:anyURI"
use="required"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="UserID" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:schema>
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Appendix B. Example of a Thraud Report
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
lang="en">
<Incident purpose="reporting">
<IncidentID name="fraud.openauthentication.org">908711
</IncidentID>
<ReportTime>2006-10-12T00:00:00-07:00</ReportTime>
<Assessment>
<Impact severity="high" completion="failed"/>
<Confidence rating="high"/>
</Assessment>
<Contact type="organization" role="creator">
<ContactName>Example Corp.</ContactName>
<Email>contact@example.com</Email>
<Telephone>+1.972.555.0150</Telephone>
</Contact>
<EventData>
<DetectTime>2006-10-12T07:42:21-08:00</DetectTime>
<Flow>
<System category="source">
<Node>
<Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.53</Address>
</Node>
<Description>Source of numerous attacks</Description>
</System>
</Flow>
<AdditionalData dtype="xml">
<FraudEventTransfer xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-
1.0" xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:thraud-1.0">
<BankID
namespace="http://www.openauthentication.org/thraud/resources/
bank-id-namespace.htm#american_bankers_association">123456789</BankID>
<AccountID>3456789</AccountID>
<AccountType lang="en">saving</AccountType>
<TransferAmount currency="USD">10000</TransferAmount>
</FraudEventTransfer>
</AdditionalData>
</EventData>
</Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
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Authors' Addresses
David M'Raihi
VeriSign, Inc.
685 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Phone: 1-650-426-3832
EMail: davidietf@gmail.com
Sharon Boeyen
Entrust, Inc.
1000 Innovation Drive
Ottawa, ON, K2K 3E7
Canada
Phone: 1-613-270-3181
EMail: sharon.boeyen@entrust.com
Michael Grandcolas
Grandcolas Consulting, LLC
247 Ocean Park Blvd.
Santa Monica, CA 90405
USA
Phone: 1-310-399-1747
EMail: michael.grandcolas@hotmail.com
Siddharth Bajaj
VeriSign, Inc.
487 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Phone: 1-650-426-3458
EMail: sbajaj@verisign.com
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